L&N in the Civil War review

The L&N Railroad in the Civil War, by Dan Lee (2011 McFarland, www.mcfarlandpub.com 800-253-2187) 214 pages, index, illustrations, map - $35 (paper)

Being a self-professed "railroad nut" in addition to being a Civil War historian, I love books that combine both topics. Although Festus Summers' work on the B&O in the CW back in the '30s was the first such to specifically tackle the topic, few works appeared afterward devoted solely to one line during the years 1861-65. That has changed in recent years - David Stone's Vital Rails about the Charleston & Savannnah was excellent and Dan Lee's recent McFarland release on the L&N is a good one as well.

Although at just under 200 pages of text, The L&N Railroad in the Civil War is shorter than most McFarland books, it is one of their better releases (though still pricey at $35 for a paperback). Lee is quite knowledgeable on the Civil War in Kentucky and it is very apparent in his writing, for this is more than just a recounting of John Hunt Morgan's raids on the Louisville & Nashville or James Guthrie's exploitation of the Federal government, it is a good concise history of the war in the central portion of the Bluegrass State.

Lee provides an excellent summary of the importance of railroads during the Civil War: "Civil War generals were notoriously slow in giving up the Napoleonic tactics they had studied at West Point...And yet, somehow, the generals were uncharacteristically quick to realize the importance of railroads, and they fought to deprive the enemy of their use. Some 30 percent of Union forces were assigned to railroad defense. Every theater of war saw railroad destruction as a costly but necessary feature of the struggle." (p 11)

The L&N was one of but a few railroads that spanned the border betwixt United States and Confederate States in 1861, giving both sides an interest in it. Its president James Guthrie - one of the most influential businessmen of the 1850s and 1860s, and Franklin Pierce's Secretary of the Treasury - was not one to ignore the unique situation into which this placed his railroad. He courted both sides and would eventually gain for his railroad benefits given no other line by the Lincoln Administration during the war. He was simply too politically well-connected and his railroad too militarily important to antagonize.

The L&N had been constructed before the war to a standard not often seen on other lines at the time (though Billy Mahone's Norfolk & Petersburg was more than a rival in terms of quality). One of the engineers was Albert Fink - one of the most brilliant railroad men and engineering minds of the 19th century. Having such high standards aided in keeping the line in efficient operation throughout the war, despite the destruction of some of its most important engineering feats - the bridge at Gallatin and Big South Tunnel and constant raids by John Hunt Morgan and Joseph Wheeler.

While Bedford Forrest and Earl Van Dorn's combined Holly Springs-West Tennessee raids in late 1862 often are credited as being the most successful cavalry raids of the war and the only "raid" that had a major strategic effect on a major campaign, Morgan's raid on the L&N earlier in '62 was no less spectacular and had a similar effect. Morgan's Gallatin raid in August 1862 destroyed 800 feet of tunnel among other things, crippling Don Carlos Buell's supply line and forcing him to abandon his planned move into the Tennessee interior and Chattanooga (although subsequent moves by Braxton Bragg and Kirby Smith into Kentucky would have forced him to abandon the Tennessee campaign). Writes Ball: "Morgan could not have known it, but he would never do anything greater than what he had just done for the Confederacy. The railroad was closed for 98 days, but its importance is seen in the context of the larger picture. For the first time Morgan had conducted a raid, not only to satisfy his personal craving for adventure and attention, but in co-operation with a major military objective, stopping Buell." (p 72)

But John Hunt Morgan's destruction done to the L&N could have been much worse than it actually was during 1862. When the "Thunderbolt" captured a train, enemy soldiers were of course captured and military stores and equipment either captured or destroyed, as often was the train itself. However if a number of ladies were present on the train, the chivalrous Morgan would spare the train so as not to deny the ladies transportation. "If James Guthrie had loaded a delegation of women on every train, he might have save a lot of rolling stock and a good many locomotives." (p 62)

Lee does sometimes get sidetracked on tangents not directly related to the L&N (for instance the level of detail in retelling of Morgan's capture), but these are not detrimental, as they just serve to paint a larger picture of the war in Kentucky and Tennessee. It is very apparent from his writing that he is not a fan of Albert Sidney Johnston or John Bell Hood, and is quite partial to Joseph Johnston. And like many other writers he falls prey to the incorrect notion that a close pre-war friendship existed betwixt Braxton Bragg and Jefferson Davis. However, none of this is any great fault. What is a major flaw is the maps - or lack thereof. There is but one map - of the war-time L&N - and it is located at the very back of the book when it should have been placed near the front.

Yet the book overcomes its lack of maps with excellent content. Lee does not get bogged down (as is so easy to do) with raw data of annual tonnage moved, net revenues, etc. lifted straight from the L&N annual reports. The narrative is very readable, flows well, and is more or less on topic.

What is missing - although admittedly out of the scope of this book - is an appendix telling "the rest of the story" of the L&N, which became one of the largest railroads east of the Mississippi prior to its merger into the CSX system. Also of interest would have been an short look at the L&N's involvement in the centennial tour of "The General" of Great Locomotive Chase fame, as the former Western & Atlantic had come under L&N control.

Lee's book is a well-written volume which belongs on the shelf of anyone interested in the Civil War in Kentucky, 19th century railroads, and of course is a must-have for all L&N buffs.

Church Hill Tunnel collapse review

The Collapse of Richmond's Church Hill Tunnel, by Walter S. Griggs, Jr. (2011 History Press) 125 pages, index, illustrations, map - $19.99 (paper)

Most folks know that besides Civil War history, trains are my other big interest. Growing up in Richmond, when my Dad wasn't taking me to battlefields, we were going to railroad spots. One of my favorite was a spot where we were not going to see a train (in fact we were far more likely to witness a crime there back then, although the area has been cleaned up some of late, but I still wouldn't go there unarmed). I refer to the old Chesapeake & Ohio Railway tunnel running under Church Hill from Shockoe Bottom to Fulton Yard near Rocketts Landing.

The C&O had an issue with Richmond's topography - standing right in the path of their mainline heading eastward out of downtown was Church Hill. Less than a decade after the Evacuation Fire, workers began boring a tunnel through Church Hill - almost literally right under Patrick Henry's St. John's Church - to get to Richmond's docks on the other side. Several times the tunnel collapsed, but eventually it was completed and placed in service. However, it was replaced by a viaduct along the city's riverfront as C&O officials decided to extend the line to Newport News and Hampton Roads. Post-WWI rail traffic however required the reopening of the tunnel. On October 2, 1925, a work train was sent into the tunnel which required considerable shoring up before traffic could return to it. The train never left the tunnel - it remains there to this day, possibly with some of the work crew. After rescue efforts proved unsuccessful, C&O ordered the tunnel sealed off and filled in to prevent further collapses and damage resulting to the neighborhoods above. But the disaster drew national attention and was perhaps the biggest event in the city's history since the Civil War.

The story is a fascinating one; the book, eh, not so much...

As a Richmond native I was quite familiar with the old C&O tunnel under Church Hill. My Dad had taken me to the entrance (western one) several times and recounted the story. He had worked briefly with several folks who had worked on the rescue/recovery efforts.

Intrigued by hearing his recounting of the story of the day in October 1925 when the tunnel collapsed on the work train and crew inside, I wanted to know more. But there was no BOOK on the topic - a glaring hole in both Richmond's history (the collapse was arguably the worst natural disaster to strike the city since the Theater fire of 1811) and local railroad history.

When I learned that a book had finally come out on the topic I poured over it eagerly. The Collapse of Richmond's Church Hill Tunnel, by VCU Professor Walter S. Griggs, Jr., (History Press, 2011) looks at an important episode of Richmond's post-Civil War history. However it didn't fulfill my expectations, for several reasons. First, there is NO MAP. I am a map guy - a book can never have too many maps. There is but one map in this book, on page 100 no less, and it is a VERY shoddily-reproduced one that shows not the location of the tunnel in relation to the rest of the city but instead the location of the rescue shafts dropped into the tunnel after the collapse. A reader not familiar with Richmond's geography would be absolutely lost as to where the tunnel is located and why it was even needed, due to the local topography. This is a glaring omission that should never have been allowed to happen.

Second, it is poorly written and edited (something that seems to plague many of these History Press works, in addition to poor graphic quality). There is much repetition by the author, and too much first-person usage by him in the text as well. Despite being very well researched, Griggs gets bogged down in inane details in spots while glossing over other important details that are left unexplored. Despite interviewing witnesses and participants over a period of 50 years, the apparent depth of this research does not come through in the text.

But Griggs' work is not without merit. As noted above, it is quite well researched. After the collapse occurs, Griggs devotes a chapter to each successive day of the rescue efforts - a much more understandable and readable approach than combining all into one or two chapters (although some of the resulting "chapters" are literally one or two paragraphs). And needless to say the book fills a void in Richmond history. Griggs even tackles the popular story of the "tunnel vampire" - most authors, if they even mentioned such at all, would likely have only in passing mentioned the birth of that legend arising from the tunnel disaster.

At 120 pages, Collapse is a quick read (I read it in a single afternoon). But sans maps it can't really be deemed a "field guide" (although most folks know NOT to venture around that area, especially the east portal). The length is typical, though, of similar works by the History Press.

This is one of those books that crosses subject lines and would appeal to several audiences: Richmond history folks, railroad buffs - C&O folks in particular, and those with an interest in engineering history as well (although details on the actual structure of the tunnel itself are sparse, despite the author's harping on the unstable composition of Church Hill).

While Griggs has at least given interested audiences a book to turn to for more information, the definitive work on the subject of the Church Hill Tunnel remains to be written.

Stuart's Tarheels

A short review of a re-release, originally published by Butternut & Blue, but now a second edition from McFarland (which of course means a hefty price tag, in this case $55):

Chris Hartley’s revised edition of Stuart’s Tarheels: James B. Gordon and his North Carolina Cavalry in the Civil War has two strengths. First is a nearly 150-page roster of the 1st NC Cavalry, which makes the book a necessity for anyone with a vested interest in that regiment. Second is the book’s penultimate chapter about Sheridan’s Yellow Tavern raid and Gordon’s role in the Confederate response to it; most writers focus – and understandably so – on the actual Yellow Tavern fight and mortal wounding of Stuart, with just a passing reference to Gordon’s North Carolina brigade nipping at Sheridan’s heels while the majority of the Federals engaged Stuart’s two brigades. Hartley outlines Gordon’s movements and the running engagement with David Gregg’s horsemen along Mountain Road, putting it in proper context with Stuart’s and Fitz Lee’s fight at Yellow Tavern. He continues this narrative to the following day with the fight at Brook Church and Meadow Bridge just north of Richmond – which proved to be Gordon’s last fight – another part of the Yellow Tavern raid that is seldom treated in any great detail.

Maps and photographs are adequate, although more of both would be welcome additions (although the maps themselves are somewhat lacking in detail). Many of the engagements described are not covered in any great detail, even when Gordon’s command played an important role. References to what Gordon or others saw or were thinking, which cannot be documented, are numerous.

While the author’s writing style can be trying at times, the information contained is useful, especially for those with an interest in Stuart’s North Carolina brigade. For cavalry aficionados or historians of North Carolina in the war, Stuart’s Tarheels is essential.

Bragg review

General Braxton Bragg, C.S.A.
Samuel J. Martin
2011, McFarland, 536pp

Few if any Confederate Generals are as maligned and misunderstood – both by their contemporaries as well as historians – as Braxton Bragg. To most today, a mention of the man’s name conjures up almost automatically an officer plagued by incompetence, bad luck, or both. But was Bragg truly the inept commander, who owed his position solely to his friendship with Jefferson Davis, that he is so often made out to be?

Author Samuel J. Martin, in his new General Braxton Bragg, CSA (2011 McFarland) argues no, and makes a very compelling case that Bragg was simply an officer whose Civil War career was cursed with bad luck and incompetent subordinates. Martin’s Bragg is not just a reappraisal of Bragg, but one also of Bragg’s personal friend and frequent battlefield enemy William T. Sherman, senior Confederate leaders in the Army of Tennessee, and Confederate strategy in the West overall. Understandably Martin is very critical of Bragg lieutenants Leonidas Polk and D.H. Hill, who were both very vocal opponents of Bragg while under his command and often disregarded his direct orders, but the author also is almost equally critical of John C. Breckinridge who was also a Bragg detractor (to the point that a duel between them was narrowly avoided). To this reviewer – an admitted fan of the former Vice President and victor at New Market – Martin’s criticism of Breckinridge’s generalship is a bit extreme. Other Bragg enemies – most notably James Longstreet and Simon Buckner – and their respective feuds with the commander of the Army of Tennessee are examined in detail as well.

The reader first finds Bragg’s family in humble beginnings in North Carolina. Martin proposes that part of Bragg’s difficulties with some officers – in particular Polk – may have stemmed from the societal class distinctions between them; that some from the Southern aristocracy just would not be made subordinate to someone who was their societal inferior, military rank and protocol be damned. After West Point Bragg was somewhat of a problem officer – one who had no qualms about writing directly to Washington or to newspapers to address perceived grievances and faulty practices, which understandably earned him some enemies among the pre-war Army’s senior officer corps, and a court martial. The Mexican War made Bragg a well-known war hero, at Buena Vista almost single-handedly giving Zachary Taylor the impetus he needed for his rise to the Presidency.

Many writers have posed that the friendship that was so evident in 1863 and ‘64 between Bragg and Jefferson Davis developed in Mexico. Martin destroys this premise – Bragg, who was never a fan of non-military men holding the office of Secretary of War, thought he would have a sympathetic ear in Washington when Davis became Franklin Pierce’s War Secretary. This notion was quickly squashed by Davis’ failure to accept some of Bragg’s policy recommendations; so brusquely was it squashed in fact that Bragg counted Davis among his enemies, and had nothing good to say about Davis in his letters to his wife Elise. In that regard, there was a strong similarity between the two men – their bluntness, ability to make enemies, and their quickness to take offense. But both were also very loyal to their friends and supporters, as shown by Davis’ continued support of Polk and later of Bragg, and Bragg’s support for commanders whose performance was often less than adequate but were reliable subordinates, like Joseph Wheeler.

Bragg’s Civil War career occupies the majority of the book, beginning with his command at Pensacola. Had fate been somewhat kinder to him, it could have been Braxton Bragg and Ft. Pickens rather than P.G.T. Beauregard and Ft. Sumter that garnered headlines in April 1861. Despite what many have written about the opinion of the men in the ranks toward Bragg, Martin argues that his original Pensacola troops revered him, despite his strict discipline. The oft-quoted Sam Watkins of the 1st Tennessee hated Bragg and his memoirs are filled with vitriol toward the General, sentiments which have been echoed by historians of this century, most notably pre-eminent early Army of Tennessee historian Stanley Horn.

“It seems obvious,” Martin writes, “that Bragg’s current critics are biased, looking in every instance to find fault with his actions. Bragg, as Elise [his wife] pointed out, never pursued personal glory. He assumed that history would fairly judge him. He had no idea that many students of the Civil War would instead believe the self-serving claims of his subordinate enemies, and as a result, sully his record whenever possible.” (p. 147)

Yet one notion Martin concedes to Bragg’s critics is that Bragg seldom led from the front, something he did at Shiloh and that the author proposes so shook him that he had no desire to be that close to the death and destruction resultant from his orders again– very similar to George McClellan in that regard. “Leading” from the rear on nearly every battlefield after Shiloh often caused Bragg’s orders to be not in accordance with a fluid situation at the front, and also gave his subordinates – Polk, Hill, William Hardee – the opportunity to disregard his orders.

For all its excellent scholarship and the author’s very readable narrative, three major flaws are to be found with Martin’s work. First, it is plagued by a number of misspellings and word omissions, many more than one would expect in a book of this size (and cost - $55). Second, the lack of adequate maps, especially when the author recounts the major battles of the Army of Tennessee, sends the reader scurrying for other, cartographically-better works. This is not to say the book lacks maps entirely, it does have several but these are very crude area maps for each major campaign with no troop positions. This reviewer is among those who thinks a book can never have too many maps. Third, for all the detail devoted to Bragg’s pre-war career (nearly 100 pages) and more than 350 to the Civil War years, Bragg’s post-war years are covered in a scant seven pages.

These criticisms aside, Samuel Martin has produced an excellent biography of a most misunderstood figure. An impartial view of Braxton Bragg has long been needed, and Martin delivers (although his criticism of Breckinridge and Hill sometimes goes beyond what is warranted). The reader certainly gains a new appreciation for Bragg the man as well as Bragg the officer, and the root of many of the quarrels which plagued the Army of Tennessee becomes evident. One certainly cannot have a clear understanding of the inner workings of that army without Martin’s biography.

Review - Confederate Alamo

Recently I had the opportunity to join John Fox of Angle Valley Press for a book signing. John is the author of Red Clay to Richmond: Trail of the 35th Georgia Infantry Regiment and more recently The Confederate Alamo: Bloodbath at Petersburg's Ft Gregg, April 2, 1865. I had never met John before and I'm ashamed to admit that although I had it on my shelf, I had yet to read Confederate Alamo before our signing.

Finished reading Alamo about a week ago, and am very impressed. I'm not stretching things when I say that it is one of the finest battle studies I've ever read. I grew up in Richmond and some of my earliest memories are of my Dad taking me to the battlefields around Richmond and Petersburg, including Fort Gregg, and several of my friends were historical interpreters at Pamplin Park, just up the road a mile or so from Gregg, so the Ft Gregg story was not unknown to me. And of course the fact that about half of the Federal infantry from New Market participated in the attack on Gregg also interested me. However, what was unknown to me was the magnitude of the slaughter that occurred there. The word "bloodbath" in the subtitle of the book is very appropriate. It is almost inconceivable to read some of the first-hand accounts in Alamo and translate them and the slaughter they describe to the relatively small area that is Ft Gregg. How could a slaughter of this magnitude have been so overlooked for so long? Well, Lee's surrender had a lot to do with that.

In Confederate Alamo, John Fox has unearthed a wealth of previously untapped sources - evenly balanced between North and South - and places the reader at the fort amidst the crisis that was the morning of April 2, 1865, for Lee and A.P. Hill. With only 334 defenders of the fort, the number of recollections by Confederate defenders is impressive. Numerous illustrations of the ground and the officers and men involved appear throughout the book, as do about a half-dozen excellent maps by George Skoch (who also did the maps for Valley Thunder.)

This is definitely a must-read.

Review - Men of Color to Arms

Time to catch up on backlog of book reviews...We begin with Elizabeth Leonard's Men of Color to Arms: Black Soldiers, Indian Wars, and the Quest for Equality. But first an important disclaimer: I know very little regarding the post-Civil War United States Army, and even less concerning the black units serving in it. That said, covering the role of black soldiers from 1863 until the turn of the century is a pretty big undertaking, to say the least, so I was somewhat surprised at the book's size, with fewer than 250 pages of narrative text.

Professor Leonard begins with the Civil War career of Sgt Maj Christian Fleetwood of the 4th USCT, a Medal of Honor recipient for his actions at New Market Heights on Sept. 29, 1864, and other black units of the Army of the James. Her subsequent examination of the debate over the composition of the post-war Army is of particular interest, as is the discussion of the use of black troops for occupation duty in the former Confederate states. Although I would have preferred more military detail rather than social commentary (in parts, this reads more like social history disguised as military history), Leonard recounts how the experience for the individual black soldier on the frontier varied depending on the attitudes of their company officers. In some of the instances she cites, some white officers treated their men cruelly - even one example of murder is presented - while others recognized and appreciated their fighting abilities, finding no reason to treat them any differently from white troops, and pushed for blacks to be eligible to serve as commissioned officers. Despite the lack of military detail, Men of Color to Arms is an interesting read.

Elizabeth D. Leonard
Men of Color to Arms!
ISBN 978-0-393-06039-3
W. W. Norton, 2010
315 pages, photographs, hard cover, dust jacket